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Illocutionary Speech Acts 




My aim in this paper is to examine closely the concept and institution 
of promising as it is used in ordinary language and speech act philosophy. This 
will be accomplished by 1) discussing the major tenets of speech act philosophy 
as developed by J. L. Austin J.R. Searle, 2) analyzing Derrida's critique, and 3) 
applying this critique specifically to Searle's account of the act of promising. 
In ~~ John Searle gives an Austinian account of language in 
which speaking a language is "engaging in a rule-governed form of behavior" 
(pg. 22). Speech act philosophy, then, is the analysis of these ac ts and the rules 
that govern them. For Searle the speech act is the basic unit of linguistic 
communication. It is not the symbol or token itself that is basic, but the 
production or issuance of that symbol or token. At the heart of the speech act, 
then, is the utterance, the performance of the act itself. One specific type of 
speech act is what Austin calls the performative ullerance. What is historically 
important about Austin's account ofperformatives is that they deviated from the 
positivistic paradigm that treated only those statements that were verifiably true 
or false as having sense. A pcrformativc is neiLher true nor false yet we would 
certainly not conclude that Lhey are nonsense. As its name indicates an utterance 
of this type can be used to J,lt:<rform certain acts such as promising and 
commanding. In this sense they not only say something, they .dQ something. 
Austin makes a distinction between locutionary acts and ilIocutionary acts. For 
example if I say, "The ice is cracked" I am performing the locutionary act of 
uttering a sentence in English and the illocutionary act of, in this case, warning 
someone that they had belter not walk on the ice. In this respect the 
illocutionary act carries with it a certain amount of what we will call 
iIIocutionary force. In this sense a performative utterance when performed is an 
ilIocutionary act. For our purposes "pcrformative utterance" and illocutionary 
act will be used interchangeably. 
Besides having no truth value. performatives differ from statements of 
fact in that lhere is a degree of "intention" that couples the utterance. This is not 
to say that when one utters a statement of fact such as, "The dog is on the table'" 
one does not "intend" to say it because presumably, under nonnal conditions. 
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one certainly does intend to say it. What differentiates statements of fact from 
performative utterances, on one level, is the fact that they (the latter) are 
saturated with intention. In other words, intention is necessary for a speech act 
to be truly performative. This intention seems to follow from the fact that a 
performance of an act is involved. Performatives are inherently a statement Qf 
intention whereas a statement of fact is a statement Qf fact, the structure of 
which is devoid of any inherent intention, save the intention of the speaker to 
utter the statement. Illocutionary acts, as we have said, carry some degree of 
"il1ocutionary force". Referring to this, Norris (1982) states that "performatives 
involve an intention and a commitment, on the speaker's part, to stand by his 
words and acknowledge all the obligations they entail" (pg 109). This statement 
must not be taken to hold for all performatives in the sense that not all 
performatives are acts of explicit obligation. For example, "Now I pronounce 
you man and wife" while certainly a perforrnative utterance entails no explicit 
obligation on the part of the speaker. Illocutionary force, among other things, 
has to do with the present intention and good faith of the speaker. 
What happens if the speaker does not mean what he says, and fails to 
acknowledge any and all obligations entailed? Or, if there is no obligation 
entailed, what if there is no intention on the part of the speaker (i.e. in a play). 
For example, what if I made a promise but then said I was just kidding? For 
Austin the speech act is not "felicitous", A true or serious speech act is subject 
to conditions. One is that whoever utters it must be in "good faith" or sincere. 
Others include a "correctness of form and propriety of context" (Norris, 109). If 
these conditions are not more than the act loses performative status and, for 
example, a promise would not be completed. The illocutionary act must 
embody the presence of intention in a certain context. 
This is unproblematic for the Austinian because in ideal ordinary 
language the gap between intention and expression is not that large. This suits 
the speech act philosophers well. For, curiously, they are not concerned with the 
deviant cases of the speech act. 
In short, I am only going to deal with a simple and 
idealized case. This method, one of constructing idealized 
models, is analogous to the sort of theory construction that 
goes on in most sciences, e.g., the construction of economic 
models, or accounts of the solar system which treat planets as 
points. Without abstraction and idealization there is no 
systematization. (Searle, 1969). 
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It is at this point that we come to the problems of speech act 
philosophy, especially as it concerns illocutionary acts. For this we must refer 
to Jacques Derrida. 
For Derrida it is just this method of analyzing speech acts that is in 
itself misleading. This stems from an analysis of the presence of intention. To 
quote Wittgenstein, "What is the natural expression of an intention1-Look at a 
cat when it stalks a bird; or a beast when it wants to escape" (PI. 647). What 
Wittgenstein is reminding us is that the intention is best understood apart from 
some mental function or entity. 
Where Derrida finds fault with Austin and Searle is in the condition of 
a felicitous speech act that requires the speaker to "mean what he says in the 
sense of being llresentIy involved with his utterance and faithfully intending its 
import" (Norris, 1982), Derrida's point here is subtle and requires some 
discussion. The concept of presence is very important for him in general. It is a 
property of writing, says Derrida, that the reader is absent from the written sign 
when it is being written and that what is written is communicated in the absence 
of the writer. In this sense the written sign is subject to repeatability in the 
absence of the writer. Due to this repeatability the written sign may be subject 
to a certain drift or stretch in essentiality, context, and meaning. This is what 
Derrida refers to as the "iterability" of the sign. As this holds for writing so too 
does it hold for speech. In both cases it is on account of the boundlessness of 
context. For Derrida meaning is dependent on context but context, to an extent, 
is independent. While no meaning can be determined out of context, context 
itself cannot be saturated with meaning. Context itself is always open to further 
interpretations and misinterpretation, to further discussions as to what would and 
would not be relevant. This is not to say that any interpretation at any time 
would be allowed. Derrida argues that the structure of context and of the 
concept of iterability is such that any repetition, drift, or iteration will always 
carry with it a trace of meaning in previous context. Thus iterability can be 
permissive but not without bound. 
Derrida wants to argue that the grounding of the performative utterance 
in the present is too limiting. He holds that the acts get their force from 
institutions that have existed before the speaker employs the speech act. Thus, 
the institution or concept itself has the property of "iterability", or "its 
repeatability in principle in a series of tokens that, as distinct spatiotemporal 
things, to some extent differ from each other" (Staten, 1984). Thus, to Derrida, 
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difference is just as important as identity. What Derrida argues is that Austin's 
criteria for felicitous speech acts are inconsistent simply because of their 
iterability, The iterability ofillocutionary speech acts allows them to work 
when the "force of intention" is no longer present. This is evidenced by the fact 
that there is nothing inherent in or about an utterance that would allow us to 
detennine whether the original intention is there or not. As Wittgenstein points 
out ..... the most explicit expression of intention is by itself insufficient evidence 
of intention" (PI 641). The product of the iterability of the illocutionary speech 
act is the detachability of the "sign" form the intention itself. It is important to 
keep in mind throughout that Derrida does not for a moment deny the fact that 
speech acts can function the way Austin and Searle want them to, it is just that 
their glossing over of the "parasitic" cases is in itself a telling matter. 
This is an area of great disagreement between Searle and Derrida; 
Searle holds that in Derrida's criticism of himself and Austin he has severely 
misunderstood Austin's position on the exclusion of the marginal uses of any 
certain speech act. The brunt of Searle's argument is that Austin has brushed 
aside these parasitic cases simply for methodological purposes, not as some sort 
of "metaphysical" exclusion. Some sort of metaphysical exclusion docs not 
bother Derrida at this point. It is Austin's method of assuming and beginning 
with some ideal or pure speech act that is misguided. Such an idealizing is in 
itself defective to the extent that it is the possibility of borderline cases I1mt is 
necessary and cannot be ignored. Dcrricia wants to point out U13t these marginal 
cases are just as essential as the "serious cases", In this sense Dcrrida has found 
the flaw that tarnishes the idealist method wat Searle originally outlined. We 
can now consider our illustrative iIlocutionary act, promising, and flush out from 
the margins that which Searle has chosen to ignore. 
In ~ Acts Searle outlines the conditions for a promise in good 
faith, Without great detail it can be summarized as follows, where S is a person, 
His aperson, P is a proposition, T is the utterancc, and A is an action. 
1. 	 Normal input and output conditions obtain 
2. 	 S expresses the proposition that Pin U1C utterance ofT. 
3. 	 In expressing that P, S predicts a future act A of S. 
4. 	 H would prefer S's doing A to his not doing A, and S 
believes H would prefer his doing A to his not doing A. 
5. 	 It is not obvious to bow Sand H that S will do A in the 
normal course of events. 
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6. 	 S intends that the utterance ofT will make him 

responsible for the intending to do A. 

7. 	 S intends that the utterance of T will place him under an 
obligation to do A. 
8. 	 S intends to produce the knowledge of (7) in H. 
9. 	 The semantical rules of the dialect spoken by Sand H are 
such that T is correctly and sincerely uttered if and only if 
conditions 1-8 obtain. 
(Adapted from ~~, J.R. Searle). 
My contention is that Searle's formulation is (1) mistaken in many 
respects and (2) limited in application in its exclusion of marginal cases of 
promising. One must keep in mind that for the most part Searle seems to forget 
that "communication is not a closed circuit of exchange where intentions are 
never mistaken and messages always arrive on time at the appointed place" 
(Norris, 1987). 
The iterability of the illocutionary act itself should serve to preclude 
any analytic formulation of its preconditions, except, of course, if those 
preconditions can accommodate iterability, which Searle's cannot. Let us see in 
what way many of Searle's conditions preclude the function of iteration. One of 
the most interesting is (6), which allows for insincere promises. It is not the 
case that one must intend to fulfill the promise, one must simply acknowledge 
the responsibility of intention. What exactly does this mean? Why does Searle 
include this instance and not an instance of a promise made on the stage? In this 
case it seems that the difference lies in the fact that one would be held 
responsible in the first case and not the last. The difference is ethical. But 
where can Searle locate the intention? Who is to decide? Certainly not in the 
explicitness of the language, for it is language's inexplicity that masks intention. 
For example, what is the difference between the insincere promise and the 
promise on the stage. Does simply the repetition and absence of presence of the 
utterance preclude it from being a felicitous speech act? In the case of the actor 
on the stage are we to say that he is void of intention? What if the script called 
for him to actually fulfill the promise'! In this case he would certainly intend to 
fulfill it and would acknowledge this intention. Otherwise he would ruin the 
play. This brings us to (5). It cannot be obvious that what is promised will take 
place. What if for instance what the actor promised to do did not take place 
even though the script said it would. In one sense it would be odd to reproach 
him by saying, "But you promised!". Yet in an obscure sense he did not do 
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what he promised. With regard to (3) he is certainly predicting some future act. 
I do not pretend that promising in a play and promising out of the context of a 
play are indistinguishable, because they are. What I want to point out is that 
Searle's conditions presuppose the validity of the present intent of the speaker. 
Another interesting feature of these conditions is the fact that they do 
not necessitate the utterance of the word "promise". In other words the 
expression of the promise need not incl ude the world "promise". This is evident 
in the fact that "I will take you to the store", and "I promise to take you to the 
store" may each fulfill Searle's conditions. Austin is sympathetic to this 
concern. Does one seem to have less intention than the other? Certainly not, 
one either intends or does not intend, one cannot "sort of intend". Wherein lies 
the difference? Consider the following, "I wil1 take you to the store, I promise". 
Here "I promise" is added to the end of the sentence, it seems, as an emphasis. 
Emphasis of what, of intention? In both cases one, supposedly, intends to carry 
out whatever action. In both cases we have a prediction about the future in that I 
am predicating of my self that I will do a certain action at a certain time from 
present. The only thing that differs is the actual words themselves. A Fregian 
might want to say something to the effect that the sense of the propositions are 
different. But does this change the degree of responsibility and obligation 
entailed by each? Why should it and why would it'! It seems in one sense one 
would want to use the word "promise" when he is very confident (not obvious) 
that whatever is predicted will come to be, and not use it when the converse is 
true. Yet this assumes a differing degrcc of responsibility, or for that matter 
"force" of intention. What I am getting at here is the fact that Searle's 
formulation in no way necessitates the use of the "iIIocutionary force indicating 
device," namely the sign "I promise". Where does this leave promising? 
Searle envisions the illocutionary act as saturated with intent, ideally. 
Thus expressed, in our example, the utterance and the intention are 
indistinguishable. What I have tried to indicate specifically, and what Derrida 
has mentioned generally, is that when one distinguishes utterance from intention 
than it becomes clear that any attempt to formalize an utterance such as 
promising as grounded in intention is mislead and incomplete. The anomalies of 
a speech act themselves serve to undermine its very foundation as a speech act. 
Especially as in this case it is apparent that the self indenlity of the intention is 
distinct from the utterance itself. This is only possible when we, like Derrida, 
recognize the anomaly as a necessary possibility. 
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